The U.S. Navy is currently undertaking its most extensive renovation of its covert undersea surveillance network since the 1950s, in light of China’s escalating naval capabilities and the rapid evolution of maritime warfare technologies. Beijing is also pursuing comparable initiatives.
Located on a windswept island 50 miles north of Seattle, there’s a U.S. Navy monitoring station that was once focused on tracking whales and monitoring sea temperatures. However, last October, the Navy renamed it to better align with its current mission, calling it the “Theater Undersea Surveillance Command.” This renaming is part of a larger military project that aims to revamp America’s anti-submarine spy program, marking the most significant update since the end of the Cold War.
The project, known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), has not been previously reported. It involves modernizing the existing network of underwater acoustic spy cables and equipping surveillance ships with advanced sensors and subsea microphones. These efforts are designed to enhance the military’s capacity for spying on potential adversaries. Additionally, the United States plans to provide Australia with similar technology to strengthen allied defenses in the Pacific region.
One of the most noteworthy changes in the Navy’s ocean reconnaissance system involves investing in new technologies to make traditional maritime surveillance tools smaller and more globally accessible. The original network of covert spy cables, initially designed to monitor Soviet submarines many decades ago, is being updated. The Navy’s plan includes deploying unmanned sea drones to detect enemy vessels, placing portable “underwater satellite” sensors on the seafloor to scan for submarines, using satellites to locate ships by tracking their radio frequencies, and employing artificial intelligence software to expedite the analysis of maritime intelligence data, significantly reducing the time required compared to human analysts. These developments come amid rising tensions with China, which has been increasing military activities near Taiwan, raising concerns about a potential conflict over the democratic territory that Beijing aims to control.
The IUSS (Integrated Undersea Surveillance System) was only publicly acknowledged in 1991 after the Cold War ended, and its operational specifics have remained highly classified, as revealed by three undisclosed sources. These individuals chose to discuss the classified program anonymously.
Reuters managed to assemble information about the unit’s plans by conducting interviews with over a dozen individuals involved in the project. This included two current Navy personnel engaged in maritime surveillance, advisors to the Navy, and defense companies participating in the initiatives. Additionally, a review of hundreds of Navy contracts unveiled approximately 30 agreements related to the surveillance program, signed within the last three years, involving major defense corporations and startups working on unmanned sea drones and AI processing.
Furthermore, Reuters conducted an analysis of ship-tracking data and satellite imagery, uncovering previously undisclosed details concerning the Navy’s covert underwater cable installations. The IUSS is overseen by Captain Stephany Moore, an experienced Navy intelligence officer, and operates under the command of Rear Admiral Richard Seif, who heads the Submarine Force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Both Captain Stephany Moore and Rear Admiral Richard Seif declined interview requests. In response to inquiries from Reuters, a spokesperson for the Submarine Force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet stated that the Navy couldn’t disclose specific details regarding its undersea surveillance system due to “operational security reasons.” The spokesperson mentioned that these systems would continue to evolve and be updated as new subsea technologies emerge and defense priorities shift.
Tim Hawkins, a spokesperson for the U.S. 5th Fleet, based in the Middle East and leading U.S. sea drone trials, informed Reuters that the Navy is enhancing surveillance capabilities from space to the seabed, with the goal of achieving the most comprehensive view of global maritime activity.
Simultaneously, China is actively developing its own maritime espionage program, known as the “Great Underwater Wall,” according to two U.S. Navy sources. This system, already in progress, involves the deployment of cables with sonar listening sensors on the seafloor in the South China Sea, an area marked by territorial disputes between China and its neighboring nations. China is also constructing a fleet of underwater and surface sea drones to search for adversary submarines.
China’s efforts extend across the Pacific as well. In 2018, the state-run China Academy of Sciences reported operating two underwater sensors—one in the Challenger Deep in the Mariana Trench, the deepest known point on Earth, and the other near Yap, an island in the Federated States of Micronesia. While China claims these sensors serve scientific purposes, U.S. Navy sources suggest they could potentially detect submarine movements near the U.S. naval base on Guam, a Pacific island territory.
China’s Ministry of Defense and Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comments regarding any aspect of this report.
The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the primary battleground for military rivalry between the United States and China. China’s escalating belligerence towards the U.S. ally Taiwan, its territorial conflicts with neighboring countries, and its objections to the enduring American naval presence in the area, which Beijing regards as provocative, have intensified tensions between these two major global powers.
The U.S. Navy’s drive to enhance surveillance capabilities is motivated by three key factors, as revealed by three individuals familiar with the plans.
Firstly, it’s in response to China’s rapid ascent as a maritime power, which raises concerns about the potential for Chinese vessels to threaten Taiwan or disrupt critical undersea infrastructure such as oil pipelines and fiber-optic internet cables.
Secondly, Ukraine’s successful use of innovative maritime warfare tactics during its counteroffensive against Russian forces has underscored the vulnerability of large surface vessels to drone attacks. This has prompted the U.S. Navy to both develop its own drone technology for offensive operations and improve defenses against such attacks. Consequently, submarine warfare may gain heightened significance in potential conflicts with China.
Lastly, the swift pace of technological advancement, encompassing more advanced underwater sensors, artificial intelligence, and sea drones, has fueled a competitive surge in surveillance capabilities between Beijing and Washington.
According to Brent Sadler, a former U.S. Navy submarine officer, the upgrades in the U.S. Navy’s capabilities are long overdue and progressing too slowly. He attributes this slow pace to the Pentagon’s continued emphasis on constructing large warships and submarines. Sadler, who currently serves as a naval warfare fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a think tank in Washington, stressed the urgency of investing more rapidly in next-generation capabilities. He expressed concerns that the United States is losing its technological edge, with China making swift advancements in this domain.
Requests for comments regarding the Navy’s adoption of new technologies and the pace of these upgrades went unanswered by both the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense.
The United States initiated its underwater surveillance program in the 1950s, introducing a system called the Sound Surveillance System, which employed hydrophone cables (subsea microphones) positioned on the seafloor. In 1985, this program was renamed the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). This transition involved augmenting the fixed cables with the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), which consisted of long vertical sonar arrays towed beneath Navy vessels to detect enemy submarines lurking beneath the ocean’s surface.
During its zenith in the 1980s, the IUSS involved thousands of Navy personnel and operated 31 different processing facilities, with a primary focus on tracking Soviet naval activity, as documented in declassified Navy records. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the IUSS underwent reductions in scope. Analysts increasingly shifted their attention to monitoring marine life and seafloor seismic activity.
Today, only two surveillance sites remain operational: one located at the Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Washington State and the other at the Dam Neck naval station in Virginia Beach, Virginia.
Formerly known as the Naval Ocean Processing Facilities, these facilities underwent a name change last year and are now referred to as Theater Undersea Surveillance Commands. The renaming was explained as being more appropriate for the extensive scope of their mission, as stated by Jon Nelson, the commanding officer at the Whidbey Island unit, during a name-changing ceremony in October 2022.
The United States military has renewed its emphasis on ocean surveillance due to China’s emergence as a naval competitor and Ukraine’s successful use of drones to disrupt Russia’s Black Sea fleet. This renewed focus comes in the midst of a rapidly evolving maritime landscape, as highlighted by Phillip Sawyer, a retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and former head of submarine forces in the Pacific. Sawyer, who currently holds the position of Undersea Warfare Chair at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, noted that recent developments have instilled a sense of urgency that was perhaps lacking in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Adding to the sense of urgency is the imperative to safeguard the undersea internet cables that traverse the ocean floor, comprising a global network responsible for carrying 99% of transcontinental internet traffic. This intricate web of cables has become the focal point of an escalating competition between the United States and China for control over advanced technologies, as previously reported by Reuters in March.
In February, there were two instances of undersea internet cables being severed, which linked Taiwan with the Matsu Islands, a group of islands governed by Taiwan in close proximity to the Chinese mainland. Restoring full internet service to approximately 14,000 island residents took several weeks. Although Taiwanese authorities expressed suspicions that two Chinese vessels were responsible, they provided no concrete evidence and refrained from labeling it as a deliberate act.
At that time, China did not provide any official comments on the incident, and even now, there has been no response from China’s defense and foreign ministries to recent requests for comments regarding this matter.
In May, the Quad, a coalition consisting of Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, announced their collaborative efforts to safeguard and expand high-speed fiber-optic cables beneath the waters of the Indo-Pacific region.
Both the Chinese and U.S. navies routinely conduct military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, an American ally, as military experts analyze potential scenarios in the event of a conflict over the island. While U.S. warships and submarines are generally acknowledged as possessing advanced technology, it’s worth noting that China boasts the world’s largest navy, comprising approximately 340 ships and submarines, as indicated in the Pentagon’s 2022 report on China’s military. Furthermore, China is actively developing more advanced nuclear-powered submarines that are characterized by reduced noise levels, making them harder to detect, according to the same report.
The cornerstone of the U.S. subsea surveillance efforts remains the extensive network of listening cables initially deployed during the Cold War, widely regarded as the most robust subsea espionage infrastructure globally. This information comes from two Navy insiders with direct knowledge of the system.
These cables played a crucial role in unraveling the mystery surrounding the tragic implosion of the privately-owned Titan submersible in June, resulting in the loss of five lives during an expedition to explore the century-old remains of the Titanic, as disclosed by the sources.
The U.S. Navy, in a statement, confirmed its assistance in locating the Titan, attributing it to the detection of “an anomaly consistent with an implosion” through the analysis of acoustic data. The Navy, however, did not respond to Reuters’ inquiries regarding the source of the acoustic data.
Over the past three years, a portion of this cable network has undergone expansion and replacement, incorporating advanced cables equipped with cutting-edge hydrophones and sensors. This upgrade aims to enhance the precision in pinpointing the locations of potential enemy vessels, according to information provided by the two individuals.
As tensions escalate with China, the United States is actively broadening and enhancing its anti-submarine surveillance capabilities. The listening network, which originated with the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) in the 1950s—comprising lengthy cables equipped with underwater microphones laid on the ocean floor to monitor Soviet submarines—has since been supplemented with additional listening cables known as the Fixed Distributed System (FDS). Data collected by submerged sensors, discreetly positioned at undisclosed locations, is relayed to onshore processing centers where it undergoes analysis to identify the presence and movements of adversary vessels.
A significant portion of this work has been conducted by the USNS Zeus, a 40-year-old vessel and the sole cable ship specifically constructed for the U.S. Navy’s operations, as informed by sources. This task force is also assisted by two cable ships, the CS Dependable and CS Decisive, owned by the private U.S. company SubCom. SubCom has gained prominence in the technological rivalry with China, as reported by Reuters in July.
To maintain the secrecy of the locations of U.S. underwater surveillance cables, these three ships have adopted a strategy known in the shipping industry as “going dark,” as detailed by the Navy sources and verified through a Reuters analysis of ship tracking data.
Under international maritime regulations, commercial ships are obliged to keep their identification transponders active to prevent collisions and aid in the fight against maritime crimes. However, nations can secure exceptions for select private vessels, particularly those involved in national security projects, according to maritime lawyer Stephen Askins based in London.
Data from the LSEG’s Eikon terminal reveals that between January 1, 2022, and August 22 of the same year, the CS Dependable and CS Decisive did not transmit identification signals for 60% and 57% of the days they were at sea, respectively.
Requests for comments on any exemptions granted to SubCom vessels went unanswered by both SubCom and the U.S. Department of Defense.
The second component of the original U.S. underwater espionage program consists of a fleet of five large catamaran-style ships equipped with the SURTASS system. These ships employ cables fitted with sonar listening equipment that is towed through the ocean.
In February 2020, the Navy granted Lockheed Martin a contract worth $287 million to manufacture advanced towed sonar arrays for their surveillance ships. The initial deliveries of these new cables took place last year, as disclosed by two Navy sources. Lockheed Martin did not provide a comment in response to inquiries.
Presently, the Navy is in the process of developing compact and mobile versions of these sonar systems, capable of being deployed covertly. These modules, known as Expeditionary SURTASS or SURTASS-E, can be housed within cargo containers that can be loaded onto any flat-decked vessel. This design enables commercial ships to conduct surveillance on behalf of the Navy, according to two sources familiar with the project.
Over the past three years, the Navy has been testing this system from an offshore supply vessel in the Atlantic and has since utilized it in undisclosed operational locations.
Furthermore, in May, the U.S. State Department announced the approval of the sale of a $207 million SURTASS-E system to the government of Australia. An Australian Defense spokesperson stated that this investment is aimed at enhancing undersea surveillance capabilities to safeguard critical infrastructure and monitor emerging subsea threats.
It is worth noting that Japan also operates a fleet of three ocean surveillance ships equipped with U.S. SURTASS cables, as reported by the two U.S. Navy sources. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force acknowledged that it is collaborating with its allies to address the heightened naval threat posed by China but refrained from providing specific details regarding surveillance operations.
The U.S. Navy is exploring innovative methods to detect submarines in regions where its naval vessels face close monitoring by China, particularly in areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, according to information provided by two informed sources.
These new approaches involve adopting more discreet techniques, such as deploying small unmanned sea drones equipped with infrared cameras and underwater microphones. Additionally, the Navy is considering deploying portable listening devices from commercial ships to enhance surveillance capabilities, as outlined by the sources.
One of the noteworthy advancements in autonomous subsea surveillance is the Transformational Reliable Acoustic Path System (TRAPS), developed by Leidos, a Virginia-based Fortune 500 defense corporation. In 2019, the Navy awarded Leidos a $73 million contract to develop this system. TRAPS is comprised of a processing unit linked to deep ocean sensors, designed to be positioned on the seafloor. It functions by monitoring submarines passing overhead, effectively operating as an underwater satellite.
These underwater surveillance units have the capability to be discreetly deployed from fishing vessels or tugboats in enemy territories, as explained by Chuck Fralick, Leidos’ Chief Technology Officer and a retired Navy officer. Fralick emphasized that it’s possible to establish listening or surveillance capability virtually anywhere in the world using these systems.
The Navy has also been conducting experiments with small sea drones, including uncrewed sailboats and autonomous miniature submarines, which come at a cost ranging from $800,000 to $3 million to construct—relatively economical in the realm of defense systems. While these drones do not currently carry weaponry, they can be equipped with high-definition cameras, underwater microphones, satellite connections, and other espionage equipment. This provides the Navy with a cost-effective means to significantly expand its surveillance capabilities, as stated by Navy spokesman Hawkins.
In the future, there is potential for these vessels to be used for tasks such as launching torpedoes to neutralize submarines, deploying underwater mines, or employing decoy devices that generate loud underwater noises to confuse adversaries, according to information provided by two Navy sources.
(Source: Joe Brock | Reuters)
